Florida Law Review
Volume 30

Issue 2

Article 4

January 1978

Florida's Sexual Battery Statute: Significant Reform but Bias
Against the Victim Still Prevails
E. Sue Bernie

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
E. Sue Bernie, Florida's Sexual Battery Statute: Significant Reform but Bias Against the Victim Still
Prevails, 30 Fla. L. Rev. 419 (1978).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol30/iss2/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida Law Review by an authorized editor of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information,
please contact kaleita@law.ufl.edu.

Bernie: Florida's Sexual Battery Statute: Significant Reform but Bias Aga
NOTES
FLORIDA'S SEXUAL BATTERY STATUTE: SIGNIFICANT REFORM
BUT BIAS AGAINST THE VICTIM STILL PREVAILS*
In a recent Wisconsin sexual battery trial a fifteen-year-old boy was convicted of raping a girl in a stairwell at a local high school. Instead of being
placed in a rehabilitative unit, the defendant was permitted to stay at home
with his parents. The judge, while issuing the decree, commented on the sexual
permissiveness of the community and women's provocative clothing and added,
"should we punish a 15- or 16-year-old boy who reacts to it normally?"' Such
sexist 2 and insensitive remarks about the violent crime of rape reflect society's
ambivalence 3 toward this deplorable crime. Women are advised not to resist for
fear of endangering their lives if they are victim to a violent rape attack; 4 yet
the fact that they have not resisted may evidence consent. 5 Women are encouraged to report rape,6 but often the reaction to such reports - the disbelief
*EDITOR'S NOTE: This note received the Gertrude Brick Law Review Apprentice Price for
the best student note submitted in the Summer 1977 quarter.
1. Gainesville Sun, June 16, 1977, at 10A, col. 1. The judge was subsequently recalled by
the voters of Madison, Wis., on Sept. 8, 1977. (The girl, incidentally, was wearing blue jeans
and a turtle neck sweater at the time of the rape.)
2. "A woman cannot be herself in modern society. It is exclusively a male society, with
laws written by men and with prosecutors and judges who judge female actions from a male
point of view." Ibsen, Notations for a Modern Tragedy, in F. SEMENBERG, LIFE OF IBSEN 316

(H. Koht trans. 1971), cited in Steinberg, The Myth of the "Evil" Female as Embodied in the

Law, 2Evr'L L. 218 (1971).
3. "In the administration of the laws against rape, most dramatically, we find exhibited
deeply ambivalent attitudes. The picture of innocence violated coexists with the version of the
fantasied rape. Special rules of evidence are devised which, uniquely, make the victim's
sworn testimony, even if credible, insufficient for conviction. In the attitudes of police investigators and prosecutors toward rape victims is revealed the suspicion that women universally (unconsciously) desire to be raped, and provoke or invite it by careless or calculated
actions. The penalties for rape are very high, indicating society's concern to protect women,
yet no other victim is so often treated by the entire criminal law system as 'deserving what
she got."' Babcock, Introduction: Women and the Criminal Law, 11 Am. CRIm. L. REV. 291,
293 (1973).
4. See S. Ross, THE RIoHrs OF WOMEN 183 (1973); F. STORASKA, How TO SAY No TO A
RAPIsT AND SuRvivE (1976); Holmstrom & Burgess, Rape: The Victim Goes on Trial, in 3
VI-rIMOLOGY: A NEW Focus 31 (1975); Note, Michigan's Criminal Sexual Assault Law, 8

U. MIcH. J. L. REF. 217, 226 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Michigan's Sexual Assault Law];
Note, Recent Statutory Developments in the Definition of ForcibleRape, 61 VA. L. Rav. 1500,
1506 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Definition of Forcible Rape].

5. Even if a victim has in fact resisted, the appellate court may not deem that resistance
sufficient. See Bailey v. State, 76 Fla. 213, 79 So. 730 (1918); Hollis v. State, 27 Fla. 387, 9 So.
67 (1891); O'Bryan v. State, 324 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1976). "Of course in fact most
women are socialized so as to not know how to fight .... The irony is that women who are
not supposed to know how to fight suddenly are expected to struggle, fight, resist to a high
degree, try to run away, and call for help when they are attacked and their lives are
threatened. And they are to prove in court that they did so." Holmstrom & Burgess, supra
note 4, at 36.
6. Although the number of rapes reported to the police is increasing, evidence exists
which demonstrates that the vast majority of such attacks still go unreported. Note, Cali-
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of the police • and the courts,8 the low rate of convictions,9 and the ostracism of
the victimlo - translates into a message to women that they ought not report

rape because they may be emotionally penalized by the procedure." In essence,
the rape victim is treated as if she were the offender. 2 Although only the defendant has been accused of a crime, in the minds of the jurors the victim is
also on trial."3 That the victim must prove to the jury her own innocence is a
further "indication of our judicial system's bias against the rape vicitim." 4 In
an effort to cope with the ever increasing problems with rape prosecutions, not
the least of which is the stigmatization of the victim, several states 5 and the

fornia Rape Evidence Reform: An Analysis of Senate Bill 1678, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1551, 1554
(1975). Rape is probably one of the most underreported crimes. FED. BURAU OF INVESTIGATION, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 22 (1975).
7. In a five-year study or rapes in the Washington, D.C. area, data showed that of the
reported rapes, only about one-half were investigated. K. DECROW, SExIsT JUSTICE 238 (1974).
See also Schurr, Rape: Victim as Criminal, 3 Know, Inc. reprint of series of articles published
in Pitt. F. beginning Nov. 5, 1971.
8. Schurr, supra note 7, at 4.
9. See B. BABCOCK, A. FREEDMAN, E. NORTON & S. Ross, SEX DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW:
CAUSES AND REMEDIES 822-23 & n.8, 854-55 & n.42 (1975) [hereinafter cited as BABCOCK.] In
the state of New York in 1969, 1,840 rapes were reported; one conviction was obtained.
K. DECROw, supra note 7, at 239. In 1971, out of 1,085 arrests for rape in New York City, the
state secured only eighteen convictions. S. Ross, supra note 4, at 182. One commentator states
that the reasons for the failure to charge and convict are clear: "[Liegal and social attitudes
about rape have produced a network of formal and informal restraints on the actions of
police, prosecutors, judges, and juries that hinder prosecutions for forcible rape." Comment,
Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 CAL. L. REV. 919, 928 (1973).
10. "The rape victim is made to feel guilty, shamed, and tainted." K. DECROW, supra
note 7, at 238. Another author explains the victimization syndrome: "Rape is the only crime
in which the victim is doubly violated, first by the attacker, and then by society. It is the only
crime in which social, religious and cultural core attitudes of society turn upon the victim.
In rape, society tends to blame or accuse the women." Schurr, supra note 7, at 3 (quoting
Pitt. Police Supt. Robert Colville).
11. "The stereotyped image portrayed in the mass media of rape trials as really 'raking
the woman over the coals' holds up in fact. And the treatment that the woman receives in
court is one factor influencing other women in whether or not to press charges." Holmstrom
& Burgess, supra note 4, at 33. See also Comment, Judicial Attitudes Toward Rape, 57
JUDICATURE 303 (1974): "Victims frequently report that their encounters with the police,
district attorneys and courtroom personnel were more traumatic than the rape incident itself." Id. at 303; J. MACDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL 238 (2d ed. 1969); Schurr,
supra note 7.
12. That the victim also is on trial becomes apparent when one examines the issues
which most frequently arise during the trial: "did the woman consent; did the woman
struggle; the woman's sexual reputation, habits, and behavior; the woman's general character;
what was the woman's emotional state; did the woman report the rape; and is her statement
that sex actually occurred accurate?" Burgess & Holmstrom, Rape: The Victim and the
Criminal Justice System, in 3 VICTIMOLOGY: A NEW Focus 21, 28 (1975).
13. Holmstrom & Burgess, supra note 4, at 31.
14. Note, The Admissibility of a Rape-Complainant's Previous Sexual Conduct: The
Need for Legislative Reform, 11 NEW ENC. L. REV. 497, 505 (1976).
15. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE §§782, 1103(2)(a)-(e) (West Supp. 1977); CAL. PENAL CODE
§§261-264.1, 1127(d)-(e) (West Supp. 1977); CoLo. REv. STAT. §§18-3-401 to -410 (Supp. 1976);
IOWA CODE ANN.

§782.4 (West Supp. 1977); MICH. CoMp. LAWS ANN.
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federal government 6 have recently taken steps to reform rape legislation. The
Florida Legislature enacted a new Sexual Battery Code1 7 in 1974 in an attempt
to modernize the state's criminal rape statute.
Although the new Sexual Battery Statute is an improvement over the prior
rather broad and general rape statute,"" it falls short of the goals of reform.
This Note will examine the new sections of the Sexual Battery Code. Particular
emphasis will be placed on the section of the statute pertaining to the Rules of
Evidence because it is the least acceptable aspect of the entire chapter.1 9 Alternative means to rectify the inadequacies of the evidentiary rules of the new
code in general will be suggested.
SECTION 794.011: SEXUAL BATrRY

GeneralProvisions
With the enactment of the Sexual Battery Statute came the abolishment of
the offense of rape in Florida.20 Now instead of the vague description of rape
as the unlawful ravishing or carnal knowledge of a person "by force and
against his or her will,"' 21 the new statute defines sexual battery as: "oral, anal,
or vaginal penetration by, or union with, the sexual organ of another or the
anal or vaginal penetration of another by any other object; however, sexual
battery shall not include acts done for bona fide medical purposes." 22 Thus,
the statute is entirely sex-neutral;23 both victim and offender may be of any
sexual orientation;24 and the offense is no longer limited to penile penetration
1977); MINN. STAT. §§609.241-.351 (1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§40A-9-20 to -26 (Interim Supp.
Pt. 1 1975); OHIo Rxv. CODE ANN. §§2907.01-.29 (Page Supp. 1976).
16. Privacy Protection for Rape Victims Act of 1977, H.R. 4728, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977). Introduced by Rep. Holtzman (D. N.Y.) on March 9, 1977, this bill protects the victim
from cross-examination in federal courts about her sexual history. If passed, the bill will
amend the Federal Rules of Evidence as Rule 412. See text accompanying notes 169-172 infra.
17. FLA. STAT. ch. 794 (1975).
18. FLA. STAT. §794.01 (1973) provided: "(1) Whoever of the age of seventeen years or
older unlawfully ravishes or carnally knows a child under the age of eleven is guilty of a
capital felony, punishable as provided in §775.082. (2) Whoever ravishes or carnally knows a
person of the age of eleven years or more, by force and against his or her will, or unlawfully
and carnally knows and abuses a child under the age of eleven years, shall be guilty of a life
felony, punishable as provided in §775.082. (3) It shall not be necessary to prove the actual
emission of seed, but the crime shall be deemed complete upon proof of penetration only."
19. FLA. STAT. §794.022 (1975).
20. FLA. STAT. §794.01 (1973) (repealed by 1974 Fla. Laws, ch. 74-121, §1, eff. Oct. 1, 1974).
21. FLA. STAT. §794.01 (1973). Despite this language, when the statute was challenged on
constitutional grounds of vagueness, the Florida supreme court upheld its validity. Washington v. State, 302 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1974).
22. F A. STAT. §794.011(l)(f) (1975).
23. Although the former statute defined rape as ravishing or carnally knowing a female
against her will, the Florida supreme court upheld the conviction of a male defendant who
committed anal intercourse upon his prison cell mate. The court rejected the defendant's
position that "rape can only apply to the rape of one sex by another, wherein a pregnancy
can occur ....
" Washington v. State, 302 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 1974). The language of the
new statute thus conforms to the judicial construction of the former rape statute.
24. Thus, in Banks v. State, 342 So. 2d 469 (Fla. 1976), the male defendant was convicted
of sexual battery upon an eight-year-old boy by oral union with the sexual organ of the child
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of the vagina.25
One of the more positive reforms accomplished by the new statute is the
provision for lesser degrees of the offense depending on the amount of force
used and the age of the victim. Prior to the enactment of the new statute, many
juries acquitted the defendant because of possible harsh sentences. 26 Under the
former statute, 27 if the offender could be tried as an adult, the determining
factor with respect to sentencing was the age of the victim. If she was younger
than eleven, the crime was a capital offense; if she was older than eleven, the
crime was a felony. Under section 794.011, however, several degrees of the
offense are delineated, depending on both the age of the victim2s and the
amount of force used. The severity of the sentence corresponds to the variations
in those two factors.
The first substantive section 9 of the new code, section 794.011(2), provides
that if the offender is eighteen years or older and commits sexual battery upon,
or injures the sexual organs of, a person eleven years or younger in an attempt
to commit sexual battery upon that person, the crime is a capital felony,
punishable by death 30 or by life imprisonment. If younger than eighteen, the
as contrary to FLA. STAT. §794.011(2) (1975). In interpreting the word "union" in FLA. STAT.
§794.011(l)(f) (1975), the court determined that when the defendant placed his mouth on the
penis of the boy victim and drank his urine, there was a "union" of defendant's mouth with
the young boy's penis. 342 So. 2d at 470.
25. This provision provides a solution to the absence in Florida of a sodomy statute. This
offense was formerly covered by FLA. STAT. §800.01 (1973), which was declared unconstitutionally vague in Franklin v. State, 257 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 1971); the statute was subsequently
repealed by 1974 Fla. Laws ch. 74-121, §1. Copulation per os as well as per anum was prohibited under §800.01. Delaney v. State, 190 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 1966), appeal dismissed, 387 U.S.
426 (1967). These "abominable and detestable crime[s] against nature" (id. at 582) are now included in the Sexual Battery Code when forcibly committed. See Brinson v. State, 278 So. 2d
317, 320-21 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1973) for a discussion of the problems raised by the Franklin decision.
26. Convictions under FLA. SIAT. §794.01(1) (1973) resulted in a capital felony, and convictions under FLA. STAT. §794.01(2) (1973) resulted in a life felony. "The penalty for rape
can be a deterrent to conviction .... If the penalty were reduced juries might be more likely
to convict. In the eyes of the jury and society, unless a woman has been severely beaten the
penalty for the offender seems to be disproportionate to the offense. The attitude is: after all,
what harm has been done? Given the economic and social context of rape, juries are more
likely to sympathize with the offender than with the victim, and thus to acquit. What this in
turn means is that society in effect condones rape, not punishes it." Findlay, The Cultural
Context of Rape, 60 WOMAN LAw. J. 199, 205-06 (1974) (emphasis in the original). See also
BABCOCK, supra note 9, at 863; Note, Rape Reform Legislation: Is It the Solution?, 24 CLEV.
ST. L. REv. 463, 491 (1975).
27. FLA. STAT. §794.01 (1973).
28. In one instance, it is the offender's age that is determinative. FLA. STAT. §794.011(2)
(1975).
29. The definitional section is FLA. STAT. §794.011(1) (1975).
30. In a recent Florida supreme court case, Purdy v. State, 343 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1977), the
defendant was convicted of involuntary sexual battery of a child under 11 years of age, a
capital offense pursuant to FLA. STAT. §794.011(2) (Supp. 1974). The jury recommended and
the trial court imposed the death penalty. The supreme court, however, reduced the sentence
to life imprisonment, stating that an "affirmance of this sentence would require an unconstitutional mandatory death sentence [or every person convicted of this crime." 343 So. 2d at 5.
The implication is that the Florida supreme court will not impose the death penalty unless
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offender is guilty of a life felony, punishable by life imprisonment or a minimum sentence of thirty years. In neither event is consent a defense. 31 The
sentencing provision of the new statute is similar to that of the former rape
law, although the new code provides for two additional possible sentences.3 2
Furthermore, if the victim is under eleven, the critical age of the offender that
determines whether the crime is a capital offense3 3 has been changed from
seventeen years to eighteen years. 34 Thus, under the old law a seventeen-yearold offender would be subject to a harsher penalty than the seventeen-year-old
who commits the crime under present law.
Significantly, the new law accounts for the injury done to the sexual organs
of a person eleven years or younger in an attempted sexual battery. 35 The
former rape statute was silent in regard to injury of the young victim's sexual
organs during an attempted rape; the new code deems such conduct equivalent
to the completed act.3 6 Because injury to the sexual organs of a presumably
pre-pubescent child is especially serious, the recent legislative determination
that a harsher penalty should be inflicted upon the offender in this situation is
appropriate. In sentencing, the judge may use his discretion, depending upon
37
the gravity of the injuries.
something is "shown to distinguish this crime from any other violation of the same statute."
Id. at 6. Although the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Coker v. Georgia, 97
S. Ct. 2861 (1977), holding that the death penalty for conviction of the rape of an adult
woman is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment, is not directly in point, it is persuasive precedent for arguing that the Florida statute is likewise unconstitutional even though it applies to the sexual battery of a child under 11 years of age.
In the 1977 Florida legislative session a bill (H.R. 379) was introduced to eliminate the death
penalty from §794.011(2). The bill unanimously passed the Committee on Criminal Justice
but then died on the House calendar on June 3, 1977. A similar bill (H.R. 37) has been prefiled for the 1978 session. According to Rep. Elaine Gordon, sponsor of the bill, chances for
passage this time axe good, especially in light of the Coker decision, which was rendered after
the 1977 vote. Interview with Rep. Elaine Gordon in Miami (Sept. 23, 1977).
31. FLA. STAT. §794.011(2) (1975). The notion that consent is no defense when the victim
is younger than 11 years old has its roots in old case law. See, e.g., Russel v. State, 71 Fla. 236,
71 So. 27 (1916) (the elements of force and consent are not material when the victim is a
female child under the age of 10 years); Schang v. State, 43 Fla. 561, 31 So. 346 (1901) (in the
case of children under 10 years of age, the law presumes that persons of such immature age
are incapable of either consenting to or protesting against the act).
32. The sentence in FLA. STAT. §794.01(2) (1973) -was predicated solely on FLA. STAT.
§775.082 (1973), while the nev code also includes FLA. STAT. §§775.083-.084 (1975) as guidelines for sentencing. Section 775.083 provides for a fine in addition to imprisonment ($15,000
for life felony); §775.084 provides for the possibility of imposing an extended term of imprisonment for habitual felony offenders.
33. Because the death penalty is no longer available for sexual battery, the age of the
offender will no longer trigger the penalty of execution; however, a more severe penalty
may still be imposed when the offender is over 18 than is possible if he is under 18.
34. FiLA. STAT. §794.01 (1973).
35. FA. STAT. §794.011(2) (1975).
36. This situation is distinguished from the case of a victim over 11 years of age whose
sexual organs are injured in an attempted rape. In the latter case, the offense and the sentence are lesser than if the act had been completed.
37. In interpreting the old law, the Attorney General has declared that if a majority of
the jury recommend mercy, the length of the term of imprisonment is within the discretion
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Regardless of the offender's age, section 794.011(3) provides that if the
victim is over eleven, and the offender uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon
or uses actual physical force likely to cause serious personal injury, the crime is
a life felony. This same type of violent conduct was punishable as a life felony
under the former statute,3 8 not because of the use of deadly force but because
all rape by force and without the consent of a victim older than eleven was a
life felony. The focus of the new code, however, is on the amount of force used,
and because the degree of force outlined in the statute is severe, a harsher
penalty is imposed.
Section 794.011(4)(a)-(f) of the Florida Statutes delineates prohibited conduct that constitutes a first degree felony, a gradation not found in the old
statute. Regardless of the offender's age, if the victim is over eleven and the
offense is committed without consent, the crime is a first degree felony with a
maximum penalty of thirty years imprisonment when committed under any of
the following circumstances:
a) the victim is physically helpless to resist;
b) the offender coerces the victim to submit by threatening 9 to use force
or violence likely to cause serious personal injury and the victim
reasonably 40 believes the offender is capable of executing the threats;
c) the offender threatens retaliation (against the victim or third party)
and the victim reasonably 41 believes the offender is able to execute
these threats;
of the judge. OF. ATr'Y GEN. FI,. 058-38 (1958). Thus, arguably the judge possesses discretionary power in determining the length of the sentence in this situation.
38.

FLA. STAT. §794.01(2) (197f).

39. See text accompanying notes 46-48 infra.
40. That the victim must have a "reasonable" belief is open to severe criticism. During a
sexual battery the victim may not always be capable of rational thought, yet the offender is
just as guilty even though the victim was not thinking rationally in such an irrational, violent
situation. Although the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §65 (1965) requires a "reasonable"
belief that another is about to intentionally inflict bodily harm upon one before self-defense
may be utilized, the situation is different in sexual battery. First, the victim should not be
placed in the same category as a defendant pleading self-defense. Furthermore, self-defense
implies that the actor has inflicted some injury on the person who commenced the altercation. In sexual battery the victim is submitting to the offender to prevent further harm to
herself rather than injuring the offender. Thus, a subjective analysis of the situation should
be allowed when the offender makes threats of serious personal injury. See, Definition of
Forcible Rape, supra note 4: "Concern that a failure to require reasonableness might result
in unfair convictions based solely on the victim's subjective appraisal of the circumstances can
be answered in two ways. First, even with an unreasonable fear, the prosecutor must still
prove that the actor had the requisite intent to 'compel' the victim's submission to the
threat. If the actor was not aware of the risk that the victim would perceive his conduct as
threatening, then the prosecutor will be unable to prove this element of the offense. Second,
juries inevitably inject objectivity into any subjective standard. If the victim's assertion under
the particular circumstances that she perceived a threat is too divorced from that of a
reasonable person, the jurors simply will not believe that she actually did so." Id. at 1511.
"One who takes advantage of a woman's unreasonable fears of violence should not escape
punishment any more than the swindler who cheats gullible people by false statements which
they should have found incredible." MODEL PENAL CODE §207.4, Comments at 247 (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955).
41. See note 40 supra.
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d) the victim is unknowingly drugged by the offender;
e) the victim is older than eleven but less than eighteen and the offender
is in a position of familial, custodial, or official authority over the
victim and uses this authority to coerce the victim to submit4 2 or
f) the victim is mentally defective and the offender knows or has reason
to know of this fact. 3

Because the prior rape statute did not provide for a lesser charge if the crime
did not involve serious bodily harm, many juries were reluctant to convict a
defendant 44 of a life felony even though they believed some offense had been
committed.45 Now juries are afforded the opportunity to correlate the sentence
to the severity of the crime and presumably will be more willing to convict a
defendant they are convinced is guilty.
While in the prior statute" actual force was an element of the crime of
rape,47 the new statute 48 explicitly states that under certain circumstances the
threat of force is sufficient to establish a first degree felony. In other specifically
defined situations, 9 force or the threat thereof need not be present at all for
the offense to be regarded as a first degree felony. A favorable addition, this
approach comports more satisfactorily with the fact that a sexual battery may
occur without actual or threatened use of force.
Finally, section 794.011(5) provides that the offense is a second degree felony
if, regardless of the offender's age, the victim is over eleven and the offender
without consent uses physical force and violence not likely to cause serious

42. See Whiteman v. State, 343 So. 2d 1340 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1977).
43. FLA. STAT. §794.011(4)(f) (1975).
44. An example of jurors' attitudes about rape without serious bodily harm is found in
an interview with a juror in the trial of Inez Garcia, who shot a man who she claimed had
watched as another man had raped her:
BLITMAN: "Could a woman ever get off on the ground of self-defense if she killed a man

during the attack?"
RHONE [Juror]: "No, because the guy's not trying to kill her. He's just trying to give her
a good time. To get off, the guy would have to do her bodily harm, and giving a girl a screw
isn't doing her bodily harm...." Blitman & Green, Inez Garcia on Trial, Ms., May, 1975, at
49, 86.
45. Interview with Raymond Marky, Assistant Attorney General, in Tallahassee, Florida
(April 19, 1977). Mr. Marky stated that the Attorney General's Office was in favor of the new
Sexual Battery Code precisely because of this feature which allocates the sentence according
to the severity of the crime and which gives greater freedom to the jury.
46. FLA. STAT. §794.01(2) (1973).
47. See Dean v. State, 265 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 1972); Askew v. State, 118 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 1960);
Lewis v. State, 227 So. 2d 92 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1969).
48. FLA. STAT. §794.011(4)(b) and (c) (1975).
49. Subsection (a) of FLA. STAT. §794.011(4) (1975) suggests that when the victim is helpless to resist - i.e., unconscious, asleep, or for any other reason physically unable to communicate unwillingness to act-force is not at issue; subsection (d) proscribes administering
a drug to incapacitate the victim and makes actual or threatened force unnecessary in such a
situation; in subsection (e) the use of familial, custodial, or official authority to coerce the
victim to consent is made equivalent to the use of force; and in subsection (t) the fact that
the victim is mentally defective and the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe this
substitutes for actual or threatened force.
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personal injury50 Thus, where previously a conviction was highly unlikely unless severe bodily harm was shown,51 the new code allows for a more equitable
administration of justice so that juries may now concentrate on the guilt or
innocence of the defendant without concern over a punishment that might not
fit the crime.52 This addition demonstrates the legislature's recognition of the
reality that sexual battery is possible without serious personal injury and allows
the jury to respond accordingly.
The Resistance Requirement
While some obvious changes from the prior rape statute have been effected,
some elements remain the same. For example, although some states have
abrogated the resistance requirement 5 3 Florida has retained it. 54 However,
section 794.011(4)(a) does absolve the victim from resisting when physically
helpless. "Physically helpless" is defined as a condition in which one is "unconscious, asleep, or for any other reason is physically unable to communicate
unwillingness to an act."' 5 Case law prior to the enactment of the new statute
had generally held that resistance is a relative term and must be considered in
light of the special circumstances surrounding each case.5 6 The application of
this case-by-case approach subjected the parties to a possibly biased determina-

50. "Serious personal injury" is defined as "great bodily harm or pain, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement." FLA. STAT. §794.011(1)(e) (1975).
51. See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
52. Under the old statute, if the defendant was convicted of rape, the crime was a life
felony whether serious personal injury was inflicted or not. Thus, although in one case
serious bodily harm resulted and in another only bruises and lacerations, the punishment was
the same. Certainly the act of forced intercourse was equally abhorrent in either situation, but
juries were likely to acquit in the latter case because of the belief that the penalty was
disproportionate to the injury inflicted. Now that the legislature has eliminated this obstacle with respect to sentencing, the jury may assume its proper role as trier of facts.
53. MiCH. COMP. LAws ANN. §750.520i (Supp. 1977); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §2907.02(C)
(Page Supp. 1976). The Model Penal Code does not mandate resistance by the victim but does
require the threats to be such as "would prevent the resistance by a woman of ordinary resolution." MODEL PENAL CODE §213.1(2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
54. A criticism of the resistance requirement is that it endorses the pervasive community
feeling about women who are raped: "they must have been 'asking for it.' Our laws do not
require a victim of robbery to show that she or he offered physical resistance, screamed, or
tried to run away before 'consenting' to part with property. We do, however, require this type
of showing from a woman who cooperates with prosecutors attempting to obtain a conviction
of rape." K. DECROW, supra note 7, at 235-36.
55. FLA. STAT. §794.011(l)(d) (1975).
56. See Paramore v. State, 238 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1970) (jury should consider such things as
strength and physical development, evidence of or lack of injuries, etc.); Thomas v. State, 167
So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1964); Rodrigues v. State, 296 So. 2d 89 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1974) (where defendant had killed victim's boyfriend and threatened her with a gun, her fear was sufficient
so that she need not physically resist); Hill v. State, 247 So. 2d 772 (Fla. 3rd D.C.A. 1971)
(where evidence clearly establishes that the victim of rape submitted against her will and in
order to save her life, no requirement exists that she must resist as long as strength endures);
Jackson v. State, 107 So. 2d 247 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1958).
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tion of the issue. 5" Thus, in Bailey v. State,58 although the defendant seized the
victim by her arm and performed sexual intercourse while holding her down
and choking her, the court found insufficient resistance. Likewise, in Hollis v.
State,59 the victim was found not to have sufficiently resisted when the defendant held her down, choked her, and threatened to kill her if she cried
out. 60
Although one possible reading of the new Sexual Battery Code suggests a
relaxing of the resistance requirement in three sections of the statute, 6' the
courts in subsequent cases have not always relaxed the requirement but have
continued to adhere to the old standard that force and resistance are essential
elements of the crime.62 Two similar cases from two different Florida District
Courts of Appeal yielded opposite results despite the alleged use of the same
resistance standard, thus suggesting that the judges may still allow their personal bias6 3 to influence the result at the appellate level. In Berezovsky v.
State64 the victim testified that on the night of the sexual battery "the defendant threatened and used physical violence before he penetrated her; she
screamed and physically resisted defendant." 65 Though not completely in
accord regarding the facts, the Third District Court of Appeal deferred to the
finding of the jury and upheld the conviction, using the test that resistance is
relative.66 In O'Bryan v. State67 the victim testified that the defendant forced
his way into her trailer, pushed her to the floor and pinned her down with his
57. In determining if the victim actually resisted, many judges require substantial bodily
harm. One commentator asserts that "[a] woman can point to her bruises to show that force
was used, but many men, including judges, believe that women enjoy a little violence as part
of normal sex - and thus refuse to consider bruises as evidence of sex without consent."
S. Ross, supra note 4, at 182. In a telephone interview with Margaret Jost, Assistant State
Attorney in Daytona Beach and former Assistant for Prosecution of Sex Crimes (July 6, 1977),
Ms. Jost stated that judicial bias towards the rape victim is prevalent at the trial court level.
Many judges make light of the whole case, thus setting the tone for the entire trial, which
inevitably has an insidious effect upon the jury. See also Comment, supra note 11. The author
of that article conducted a study on judicial attitudes toward rape victims and reached the
following conclusion: "In recent interviews with 38 Philadelphia judges who have handled
rape cases, I found that judicial attitudes toward rape victims are far less impartial than is
frequently supposed. The judges' comments supported the allegation of courtroom victimization of some rape victims and established the need for further inquiry into judicial attitudes."
Id. at 303.
58. 76 Fla. 213, 79 So. 730 (1918).
59. 27 Fla. 387, 9 So. 67 (1891).
60. See also Bowden v. State, 152 Fla. 715, 12 So. 2d 887 (1943) (protesting not enough to
establish that the act was accomplished by force and against the victim's will).
61. FLA. STAT. §794.011(4)(a) (see text accompanying note 55 supra), (b), and (c) (1975).
In these sections threats to use force, violence, or retaliation which coerce the victim to submit may possibly be read to abrogate the necessity for actual physical resistance when no
actual force or violence is used by the offender.
62. Berezovsky v. State, 335 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1976); O'Bryan v. State, 324 So. 2d
713 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1976).
63. See note 57 supra.
64. 335 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1976).
65. Id. at 593.
66. Id. at 594.
67. 324 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1976).
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legs as he engaged in sexual intercourse with her; she screamed loud enough
to awaken one of her children. Although the jury found the evidence sufficient
to convict, the First District Court of Appeal disregarded the findings of the
jury and concluded that even though the defendant pinned down the victim's
legs and she screamed, her actions were only "protest" and not sufficient re68
sistance to negate consent.
The inconsistencies of such cases, sometimes resulting in questionable decisions, could be avoided if the resistance requirement were eliminated entirely. Because lack of consent69 is still an element of the crime, the additional
requirement of resistance is unnecessary. Victims of other violent crimes, such
as homicide,70 assault, 71 and aggravated battery, 72 are not required to resist; the
sexual battery victim should be similarly treated. 73 Furthermore, resistance en68. Id. at 714.
69. Consent has now been defined by statute: "intelligent, knowing, and voluntary consent and shall not be construed to include coerced submission." FLA. STAT. §794.011(l)(h)
(1975).
70. FLA. STAT. §782.04 (1975).
71. FLA. STAT. §784.011 (1975).
72. FLA. STAT. §784.045 (1975).
73. In urging the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association to approve a
resolution calling for a redefinition of rape, Connie K. Borkenhagen made a humorous,
though apt, presentation of how it might sound if a robbery victim were subject to the same
unreasonable demands as the rape victim:
"Mr. Smith, you were held up at gunpoint on the corner of First and Main?"
"Yes."
"Did you struggle with the robber?"
"No."
"Why not?"
"He was armed."
"Then you made a conscious decision to comply with his demands rather than resist?"
"Yes."
"Did you scream? Cry out?"
"No. I was afraid."
"I see. Have you ever been held up before?"
"No."
"Have you ever given money away?"
"Yes, of course."
"And you did so willingly?"
"What are you getting at?"
"Well let's put it like this, Mr. Smith. You've given money away in the past. In fact, you
have quite a reputation for philanthropy. How can we be sure that you weren't contriving to
have your money taken from you by force?"
"Listen, if I wanted ..."
"Never mind. What time did this holdup take place, Mr. Smith?"
"About 11:00 P.M."
"You were out on the street at 11:00 P.M.? Doing what?"
"Just walking."
"Just walking? You know that it's dangerous being out on the street that late at night.
Weren't you aware that you could have been held up?"
"I hadn't thought about it."
"What were you wearing at the time, Mr. Smith?"
"Let's see ... a suit. Yes, a suit."

"An expensive suit?"
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hances the likelihood of further physical injury and unnecessary suffering.74
Florida should heed the warning that resistance may be harmful to the victim
and should accordingly amend the statute by completely abrogating the resistance requirement.
Spousal Immunity
If read literally the new code dramatically departs from the prior law, 5 and
common law78 in general, in that one spouse would be legally capable of sexually battering the other spouse. The previous statute avoided this by stating
that any person who "unlawfully"7 7 ravished and carnally knew another was
guilty of rape. Because sexual intercourse between a husband and wife was
lawful, a husband was legally incapable of raping his wife. The classic statement of the common law presumption is found in Lord Hale's treatise of 1847:
"But the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his
lawful wife, for by their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife
hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot retract."7 8 The spousal exception is not mentioned in the new statute. In the
definition section "offender" is defined merely as "a person accused of a
sexual offense." 791 Other states 0 in reforming their rape legislation have consistently defined offender as a person other than a spouse.8 ' Because spousal
immunity is commonly granted in "viable, ongoing marriage[s],"8 12 an uncertainty exists over whether the Florida legislature intended to abrogate completely spousal immunity. That the intention of the legislature was to change
the common law spousal immunity is doubtful,88 and the courts most likely
"Well--yes. I'm a successful lawyer, you know."
"In other words, Mr. Smith, you were walking around the streets late at night in a suit
that practically advertised the fact that you might be a good target for some easy money,
isn't that so? I mean, if we didn't know better, Mr. Smith, we might even think that you
were asking for this to happen, mightn't we?"
The Legal Bias Against Rape Victims, 61 A.B.A.J. 464 (1975) (emphasis in the original). The

resolution was passed. Id. See also note 54 supra.
74. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. See also Note, The Victim in a Forcible
Rape Case: A Feminist View, 11 Am.CaM. L. Rav. 335, 346 (1973).
75. FLA. STAT. §794.01 (1973).
76. 1 M. HALE, THm HisToRY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN §629 (1847); R. PERK Ns,
CI MNAL LAws 156 (2d ed. 1969).
77. FLA. STAT. §794.01 (1973).
78. 1 M. HA.E, supra note 76 §629.
79. FLA. STAT. §797.011(1)(a) (1975).
80. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. §18-3-409 (Supp. 1976); MODEL PENAL CODE §213.1 (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
81. In fact, in carving out spousal immunity in its Sexual Battery Code, Minnesota included in its definition of spouse "adults cohabiting in an ongoing voluntary sexual relationship at the time of the alleged offense." MINN. STAT. §609.349 (1976).

82. See Note, supra note 26, at 473. Some states have abrogated the spousal immunity
protection when the couple is living apart or separated under judicial decree. See notes 86-87
infra.
83. No precedents exist for this in Florida, and if the legislature had intended to enact
such a drastic departure from long established case law and common law, one would logically
assume that such a change would have been accompanied by an expression of intent. In fact,
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would uphold the common law rule on the principle that a statute in derogation of the common law will not be extended by construction.8 4 A clarification
of this ambiguity is necessary. The legislature should further reform the Sexual
Battery Code by restricting spousal immunity to protect only those persons in
a viable ongoing marriage.8, Other states have approached this issue in one of
three ways. Spouses are deemed to lose their immunity and considered possible
offenders if: (1) they are living apart under a decree of judicial separation, s6
(2) they are living apart and have filed for either judicial separation or
divorce,"" or (3) they are merely living apart."" Florida should adopt the third
approach because many couples with incompatible marriages often live apart
but do not initiate judicial proceedings to end the marriage.
SECTION 794.021:

IGNORANCE OR BELIEF AS TO

VIcTIm'S AGE No DEFENSE

Section 794.02189 of the Florida Statutes, providing that ignorance or belief
to
the victim's age is no defense, is triggered by three sections- ° of the Sexual
as
Battery Statute, that use age as a predicate for determining the nature of the
offense. In section 794.011(2), eleven is the critical age of the victim in distinguishing a capital felony 1 from a life felony, and in determining whether conthe elimination of the spousal immunity was proposed by Rep. Elaine Gordon when the bill
was before the Criminal Justice Committee. The male members of the committee, however,
vehemently opposed such a change, so the explicit amendment was dropped. Interview with
Rep. Elaine Gordon in Miami (Sept. 23, 1977).
84. See H. BLACK, CONSTRUcTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS §113 (2d ed. 1911);
J. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTiucriON §573 (2d ed. 1904); Llewellyn, Remarks on Theory
of Appellate Decision, 3 VAND. L. RE v.395, 401 (1950).
85. Proponents of expanding possible rape offenders to include spouses who are living
apart argue that the criminal law should not discriminate against married women as a class.
They claim that the law's refusal to recognize the possibility of a husband raping his wife (or,
in sex neutral statutes, spouse raping spouse) violates the equal protection clause of the U. S.
Constitution. Thus, the same facts of criminal behavior could occur in two separate instances, but while rape would exist where there was no marital bond, it would not exist in
the other instance solely due to the fact of a legal bond of marriage. Note, supra note 26, at
472-74. Opponents, on the other hand, agree that wives should be protected by the criminal
law from forcible sexual intercourse, but contend that rape is a category ill-suited to marriage. Comment, Rape and Battery Between Husband and Wife, 6 STAN. L. REV. 719, 725
(1954). See also Michigan's Sexual Assault Law, supra note 4, at 233.
86. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §510.010(3) (Baldwin Supp. 1975); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §14:41
(West Supp. 1977); MONT. REy. CODEs ANN. §§94-5-503(1), -506(2) (1973); UTAH CODE ANN.
§76-5-407 (Supp. 1975).
87. MICH. Comp. LAW. ANN. §750.520(e) (Supp. 1977); MINN. STAT. §609.349 (1976); NEV.
REV. STAT. §200.373 (1975).
88. COLO. REV. STAT. §18-3-409(2) (Supp. 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. §40A-9-20(E) (Interim
Supp. Pt. 1 1975); Or. S.503 (1977), amending OR. REV. STAT. §163.305 (1975); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, §3103 (Purdon Supp. 1977).
89. This section provides: "When, in this chapter, the criminality of conduct depends
upon the victim's being below a certain specified age, ignorance of the age is no defense.
Neither shall misrepresentation of age by such person nor a bona fide belief that such person
is over the specified age be a defense."
90. FLA. STAT. §794.011(2), (4)(e), and .05 (1975). See text accompanying notes 91-94 infra.
91. But see note 30 supra.
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sent is an issue.92 If the victim is between the ages of eleven and eighteen and
the offender is in a position of familial, custodial, or official authority over the
3
victim, then section 794.011(4)(e) specifies the offense as a first degree felony.P
If the victim is under eighteen, section 794.05 makes consensual intercourse
with that person - if of previous chaste character94 - a second degree felony.
Because the age of the victim may be crucial in determining the fate of the
offender, section 794.021 is unduly harsh in that it denies the defenses of misrepresentation of age by the victim and bona fide belief that such a person is
over the specified age.
At common law mistake of age was not a defense; 9s however, the age of consent was only ten years, and consensual intercourse with a person over ten was
at most fornication. Florida's Rape and Forcible Carnal Knowledge Statute9 8
paralleled this construction for a number of years, making forcible intercourse
with a female over ten, or any intercourse with a female under ten, punishable
by death or life imprisonment.97
Although mistake of age should not be a defense under section 794.011(2)
because the victim must be under eleven years old,9 8 or under section
794.011(4)(e) because of the specified relationship between the victim and
offender,99 more leniency should be shown in dealing with the consensual activity know as statutory rape. 0 The refusal to allow mistake of age as a defense
to statutory rape traditionally has been based upon the moralistic concept that
intent to commit an immoral act is the same as intent to commit a crimeO1
92. See text accompanying note 31 supra.
93. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
94. A 1970 study indicates that such a statute protecting the chastity of teenagers is
anachronistic at best; of 4,220 high school students in three midwestern communities, 26% of
the 17-year-old women had engaged in premarital coitus. Verner & Stewart, The Sexual Behavior of Adolescents in Middle America: Generational and American-British Comparisons,

34 J. oF MARR. 8&FAM. 696, 699 (1972). Because the new Sexual Battery Code is sex-neutral,
one needs little imagination in foreseeing the problems in enforcing this statute. Furthermore,
a teenage couple, both under eighteen and of prior chaste character, could be guilty of a
second degree felony for engaging in consensual sexual intercourse. If §794.05 is seriously enforced, the courts will be inundated with teenage "criminals."
95. Statute of Westminster, 1275, 3 Edw. 1, c. 13.
96. FLA. STAT. §794.01 (1921).
97.

Id.

98. Most likely in that situation the sexual battery is forcible; if consent is given, the
victim's age casts considerable doubt on the consent being intelligent, knowing, or voluntary.
99. Here also the victim is relatively young (between 11-18); furthermore, because of the
special relationship between the victim and the offender, bona fide consent is questionable.
100. An infamous Massachusetts case demonstrates the dangers of a strict liability standard
in such instances. In Commonwealth v. Moore, 269 N.E.2d 636 (Mass. 1971), the defendant
picked up a woman in a bar and was subsequently charged and convicted of "carnally knowing and abusing a minor." The "victim" testified that not only had she told the defendant
that she was 18 but also had shown him an 1I). card as verification. She was on probation
from a conviction of prostitution, and apparently the police, the trial court judge, her attorney, and a probation officer all assumed she was over 18. Nevertheless, an implacable
Massachusetts court held that no affirmative defense of mistake of age was available, and that
this strict liability did not deny due process of law.
101. Mills v. State, 58 Fla. 74, 83, 51 So. 278, 281 (1910).
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However, the intent to commit fornication - a generally unenforced misdemeanor with a maximum penalty of three months 0 2 - is hardly comparable
to that required for the felony of sexual battery proscribed by section 794.05.
One author suggests that the difference is one between "response to a normal
and basic human drive with a partner who has at least reached the age at which
physical injury is unlikely," and "abnormal desire to engage in intercourse
with very young children," the latter exemplifying a dangerous propensity to
02
which the defense should not extend.
Rather than always permitting mistake of age as a defense to statutory rape,
10 4
the statute should be amended to allow for a reasonable mistake of age beyond mere ignorance or unjustified belief - as an affirmative defense. The
burden of proof would of course remain with the defendant. 0 5
SEcriON 794.022:

RULES OF EVIDENCE

The Rules of Evidence section of the Sexual Battery Statute is the most
disappointing aspect of the new law, and although suggesting reform at first
glance, 0 6 the section is primarily a codification of prior case law. Further
change is necessary to assure that the statute's ultimate purpose is served.
Corroboration
Common law rejected the notion that a complaining witness' testimony
must be independently corroborated to support a conviction for rape. 10 7 Likewise, Florida case law °8 has consistentlyo9 held that corroboration is not neces102.

FLA. STAT.

§798.03 (1975).

103. McGillicuddy, Mistake of Age as a Defense to Statutory Rape, 18 U. FLA. L. REV.
699 (1966).
104. Such a result was allowed in People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d 529, 393 P.2d 673, 39
Cal. Rptr. 361 (1964), in which the complainant (who had convinced her companion she was
18) was in fact 17 years and 9 months old at the time of the offense (i.e., voluntary sexual
intercourse). Her steady boyfriend, however, was brought to trial and convicted. Finally, the
California supreme court displayed logic and sympathy and reversed the conviction for lack
of felonious intent. The unanimous decision upheld the defendant's right to introduce evidence of his good-faith reasonable belief that the complainant was over 18. Although the
MODEL PENAL CODE §213.6 (Official Proposed Draft, 1962) adheres to the view that a reasonable mistake of age is a defense, most courts and statutes follow the traditional view of absolute liability with respect to the age of the minor. But cf. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, §11-4
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977) for an example of the minority view.
105. See McGillicuddy, supra note 103, and M. PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAw 184-85 (1951).
106. E.g., no corroboration requirement (FLA. STAT. §794.022(1) (1975)) and limited use
of evidence concerning the victim's prior sexual activity (FLA. STAT. §794.022(2) (1975)).
107. 7 J. WIGNioRE, EVIDENCE §2061 (3d ed. 1940); 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLisr LAW

264 (3d ed. 1944).

108. Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1976); Smith v. State, 249 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1971);
Truluck v. State, 108 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1959); McKee v. State, 159 Fla. 794, 33 So. 2d 50 (1947);
Doyle v. State, 39 Fla. 155, 22 So. 272 (1897); Berezovsky v. State, 335 So. 2d 592 (Fla. 3d
D.C.A. 1976); Johnson v. State, 113 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1960).
109. In only one instance has an appellate court attempted to deviate from the Florida
doctrine. Smith v. State, 239 So. 2d 284 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1970). Despite the uncontested proof
of every essential element of the crime of rape by the testimony of an unimpeached com-
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sary for conviction. However, the courts have also maintained that the testimony of the prosecutrix must be rigidly scrutinized if uncorroborated, 10 and
must be corroborated if she has been impeached or discredited, 11 or if her
12
testimony is not clear and convincing.
The new Sexual Battery Code codifies this case law and retains the provision that "the court may instruct the jury with respect to the weight and
quality of the evidence."21 3 That such an instruction is deemed permissible
dilutes the significance of the "no corroboration" requirement and gives support to some of the myths utilized to justify a corroboration requirement.1 1Wigmore, perhaps the most renowned commentator on the subject, concluded
that a female propensity exists for falsifying charges of sexual offenses by
men."" Study suggests, however, that the likelihood of false charges may actually be lower for rape than for other crimes, because the disincentives are so
overwhelming and the incentives are minimal.-1 Nonetheless, judges are alplainant, the judge remanded the case for a new trial or dismissed because of lack of corroboration ("[I]njustice would result from affirmance where the words of the complainant
are all that supports [sic] conviction ....

"

Id. at 286). Fortunately, the Florida supreme court

reversed what it labeled a novel decision, and the victim was spared another trial. 249 So. 2d
16, 18 (1971). However, had this appellate court been a trial court, the defendant could have
gone free. Because there is no appeal for the victim, it is impossible to estimate how often
the non-corroboration rule is misapplied at the trial level.
110. Thomas v. State, 167 So. 2d 309 (Fla. 1965) (where a 62-year-old victim was forced
by defendant to submit to intercourse after he grabbed her neck with both hands and
threatened to choke her, court found sufficient evidence to convict); Coker v. State, 83 Fla.
672, 93 So. 176 (1922) (calling for rigid scrutiny, court reversed for new trial to more fully

determine whether the offense was in fact committed forcibly and against victim's will);
Johnson v. State, 118 So. 2d 806 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1960) (where 18-year-old victim accepted a
ride home with defendant, and then tried unsuccessfully to jump out when he turned down
a deserted road and was subsequently held down and forcibly raped, appellate court stated

that evidence was not sufficient to show victim was forced to have intercourse against her will).
111. Ex parte Tully, 70 Fla. 1, 66 So. 296 (1914); Johnson v. State, 118 So. 2d 806 (Fla.
2d D.C.A. 1960).
112. Truluck v. State, 108 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 1959).
113. FIA. STAT. §794.022(1) (1975). When the original bill was introduced into the
Florida House of Representatives (H.R. 3814) by Rep. Gordon, et at., and in the Florida
Senate (S. 959) by S. Wilson, no provision was made for the cautionary instruction. However,
by the time the bill was drafted in its final form by the Committee on Criminal Justice, the
provision allowing for the cautionary instruction was included. Comm. Study for Fla. HR.
3814, 9 FLA. LEGIsLATuRE HousE oF RP.ESENTATivEs BiLLs 3 (1974); Comm. Study for Fla.
S. 954, 6 FLA. LEGISLATIVE SENATF BILts 3 (1974).
114. The following is an example of one such myth: "The false complaint is feared more
in rape cases than in other crimes because of the basic assumptions that many women are
either amoral or hostile to men and that women can induce rape convictions solely by virtue
of fabricated reports." Comment supra note 9, at 931.
115. 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §924a at 736 (Chadbourne rev. 1970). See also Note, supra
note 26, at 487.
116. Note, The Rape CorroborationRequirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 YALE L.J. 1365
(1972). Some of the "disincentives" to making a charge of rape are: "the stigma that attaches to
the victim of an incident culturally defined as sordid, and the humiliation caused by some

forms of publicity associated with such charges. Also to be considered are the necessity of
confronting the assailant and the reluctance to face the barbs and insinuations of the defense
attorney. There is, in addition, the fear of retaliation from the accused rapist or his friends.
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lowed to impose upon the jurors their own bias11 against sexual battery victims by charging the jury to scrutinize carefully the complainant's testimony. 118
The major objection to such a jury instruction is that it may wrongly imply
that the complaining witness is not telling the truth. The only 19 Standard Jury
Instruction which explicitly calls for cautious and careful examination of the
testimony of a witness applies to an accomplice. 1 20 The complaining witness, a
victim of a violent crime, is therefore placed in the same position as a perpetrator of a crime. The humiliation of being sexually battered and then having to
testify at trial should not be augmented by a judge's implications that the
complainant may be guilty of perjury. An instruction that every witness' testimony should be weighed carefully is sufficient; no special emphasis should be
2
placed on the testimony of the victim.1 1
Finally, there is the deterrent effect of the existence of the corroboration requirement itself,
at least to the extent that a potential complainant may be aware of it." Id. at 1374.
117. Interview with Margaret Jost, supra note 57.
118. In two cases that have reached the appellate courts since the enactment of FLA. STAT.
§794.011(1) (1975), the jury has been instructed to carefully scrutinize the testimony of the
prosecutrix. Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1976); Berezovsky v. State, 335 So. 2d 592
(Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1976). The instruction in Tibbs provided in pertinent part: "If the testimony
of the female is not supported by other evidence, her testimony should be rigidly examined,
especially as it related to the nature and extent of the force used and as it related to the
question of whether or not consent was ever finally given." Record at 808-09 (quoted in Brief
for Appellee at 3). Despite the rigid scrutiny, the jury convicted the defendant. (How many
times such a defendant is acquitted is unkown because such cases do not reach the appellate
courts.) The Florida supreme court, however, usurping the function of the jury, determined
that the testimony did not meet the rigid scrutiny test and thus reversed. Such abuse of
judicial authority is uncalled for and suggests the prejudice many judges have against rape
victims. But cf. Williamson v. State, 338 So. 2d 873 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1976) (defendant claimed
reversible error because the trial court did not specifically instruct the jury to rigidly scrutinize
the victim's testimony; in affirming the conviction, the court declared that under the new
Sexual Battery Code such instruciion is within the discretion of the trial judge and therefore
no error was committed).
119. The Standard Jury Instruction in rape cases does not explicitly mandate the judge
to instruct the jury to rigidly examine the complaining witiness' testimony; rather, that is
left to the trial court's discretion. FLORIDA STANDARD JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES 97106 (2d ed. 1976). This is also suggested by FLA. STAT, §794.022(l) (1975).
120. This jury instruction provides: "The testimony of an accomplice must be received
with great caution and carefully and closely examined by you before a conviction is based
upon it. This is particularly true when there is neither direct testimony nor circumstances
tending to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice. However, the testimony of an accomplice, even though uncorroborated, is sufficient upon which to base a conviction if you
are convinced by it of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." FLORIDA STANDARD
JURY INSTRUCTIONS IN CRIMINAL CASES, supra note 119, §2.13(d) at 35.
121. "[T]here is no reason to conclude that juries are less able to deal with fabrications
in rape than they are in any other types of cases. The 'beyond reasonable doubt' standard
should be adequate to guard against unjust convictions." Note, supra note 74, at 337-38. See
also Comment, supra note 9, at 938-39: "Nothing comparable to these restrictions exists elsewhere in criminal law. If, for example, a woman brings a charge of kidnapping, and the
question of her consent to be moved depends upon whether the testimony of the accused or
the victim is more credible, no set of laws comparable to rape laws comes into play to protect the accused. As far as the jury's ability to resolve the issues is concerned, however, there
seems to be no substantial difference between an uncorroborated charge of kidnapping and
an uncorroborated charge of rape. Juries exist, after all, to decide whose testimony is more
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PriorSexual Activity
While some other states1 22 are modernizing their rules of evidence concerning the prior sexual activity of the victim, Florida has failed to follow the trend
of reform. Instead, the Florida Legislature has produced a careless codification 23 of some of the case law and judicial custom. Furthermore, the new statute is silent with respect to reputation evidence concerning the victim's
chastity, with the result that case law must be followed. Not only are there
substantive defects in section 794.022(2) of the Florida Statutes, but flaws in
form are present as well.
An examination of the test of section 794.022(2) exposes the problem:
Specific instances of prior consensual sexual activity between the victim
and any person other than the offender shall not be admitted into evidence in prosecutions under §794.021; however, when consent by the
victim is at issue, such evidence may be admitted if it is first established
to the court outside the presence of the jury that such activity shows
such a relation to the conduct involved in the case that it tends to establish a pattern of conduct or behavior on the part of the victim which is
relevant to the issue of consent.
The text erroneously refers to section 794.021, the statute denying a defense
for ignorance or belief as to the victim's age. That this is the intended section
25
to which section 794.022(2) is to apply is unlikely. 24 As noted previously,
1 6
section 794.021 applies to the offense of statutory rape.' Because of one of the
very elements of the crime - that the victim must be of previous chaste character - evidence of prior consensual sexual activity becomes essential. To deny
the admission of this evidence in such a case would defeat the gravamen of the
crime. Therefore, the intended and most logical reference contemplated by the
evidence rule must be section 794.011 (Sexual Battery),127 especially because
credible, and they are instructed to convict only if satisfied of the accused's guilt. There
should be no special rules for rape."
122. CAL. Evm. CODE §782 (West Supp. 1977); COLO. REv. STAT. §18-3-407 (Supp. 1976);
IOWA CODE ANN. §782A (West Supp. 1977); MIcH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §750.520j (Supp. 1977);
OHIO Rav. CODE ANN. §2907.02(D) (Page Supp. 1976); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, §21.13
(Vernon Supp. 1978). The federal government has also proposed legislation to modernize the
rules of evidence in a rape trial. H.R. 4728, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
123. FA. STAT. §794.022(2) (1975).
124. The bill was amended on motion by Senator Smathers, changing the original
"§794.02" to read "§794.021" in conformance with the draft then on the floor. Amendment to

Fla. S. 959 (Reg. Sess. 1974, introduced by S. Wilson), reprinted in

JOURNAL OF THE SENATE,

Reg. Sess. 1974, at 509. At the time of that amendment, §794.021 was the Sexual Battery
Statute (now §794.011). A subsequent renumbering of the section to §794.022(2) (with no
further amendment to the bill) resulted in the present muddle. One should note that in
§794.022(1) an identical error in numbering was made, but it was subsequently corrected in
FLA. STAT. §794.022(1) (1975) and in FLA. STAT. ANN. §794.022(1) (West 1976); why the mistake was not corrected in subsection 2 is unclear. However, the error still remains in FLA.
STAT. ANN. §794.022(1) and (2) (Harrison Supp. 1976).
125. See text accompanying note 94 supra.
126. FLA. STAT. §794.05 (1975).
127. See note 124 supra.
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the thrust of section 794.022(2) is the issue of consent - crucial under section
794.011.
Rather than rectify this numerical error, the Florida Legislature should
repeal the entire section and replace it with a law which more closely comports
with contemporary mores. 'The myths that an unchaste woman would more
likely consent to such an act than a virtuous woman 12 8 and that an unchaste
woman cannot be raped 129 are no more valid today than they were when
originally propounded. Yet., despite a dramatic change in sexual behavior,
these anachronistic attitudes are still reflected in current judicial decisions. At
least one commentator was provoked to proclaim that "the great weight still
given in some jurisdictions to evidence of past unchastity is simply part of the
larger view that rape laws are designed primarily to protect virginity and
marital fidelity .... "130 Another commentator is of a similar opinion: "The
concentration upon the reputation of the prosecutrix, almost as if she were the
one whose guilt or innocence were to be determined, is an indication of the
bias against the rape victim in the current system."' 131
Yet the legal literature is still plagued with unrealistic and outdated
reasoning: "Fortunately the character of the woman as to chastity or unchastity
is admissible in evidence because of its probative value in judging whether she
did or did not consent to the act in question.' 13 2 A perusual of legal commentators 2 3 on this subject reveals that no general agreement exists as to the admissibility of evidence of the victim's prior acts of sexual intercourse. Indeed,
34
WVigmore states that no evidentiary question has been more controverted.1
128. See Note, supra note 26, at 478. Until January 1, 1975, California utilized the following typical jury instruction: "A woman of unchaste character can be the victim of a forcible
rape but it may be inferred that a woman who has previously consented to sexual intercourse
would be more likely to consent again." COMM. ON STANDARD JURY INsTRUcTIONS, CRIMINAL
CAL. JIC §10.06 (3d rev. ed. 1970). For a cogent argument against this line of inference, see
Note, supra note 14, at 502.
129. See Comment, supra note 9, at 938.
130. Definition of Forcible Rape, supra note 4, at 1509.
131. Note, supra note 74, at 343. See also note 12 supra and accompanying text; Definition of Forcible Rape, supra note 4, at 1542: "The connotation of the word 'rape' is difficult
to alter, and thus the traditional idea of a rape trial as an inquiry into the prior sexual conduct of the victim in order to determine whether she 'got what she deserved' will take time to
erase."
132. R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 158 (2d ed. 1969). But see Note, supra note 74, as to
character evidence of chastity or want thereof: "[I]ts probative value is arguably low since
the fact that a woman has consented to sexual relations with men in the past does not show
that she has consented to intercourse with a particular man on a particular occasion. The
probative value of character evidence on the issue of consent may also be outweighed by its
prejudiciality to the victim. Such evidence should, in most cases, be excluded." Id. at 345.
133. See Washburn, Rape Law: The Need for Reform, 5 N.M. L. REv. 279 (1975); Note,
Evidence - Rape Trials- Victim's PriorSexual History, 27 BAYLOR L. Rav. 362 (1975); Note,
Sexual Assault Law Reform in Colorado:An Analysis of H. B. 1042, 53 DEN. L.J. 349, 377-80
(1976); Note, supra note 6; Note, Limitations on the Right to Introduce Evidence Pertaining
to the Prior Sexual History of the Complaining Witness in Cases of Forcible Rape: Reflection
of Reality or Denial of Due Process?, 3 HoFsTRA L. REv. 403 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Limitations on Evidence].
134. 1 J. WIGMORE, supra note 107, §200.
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Because of the potentially degrading ordeal 135 of cross-examination,136 this
controversial evidentiary rule is believed to be responsible for many of the
failures by victims to report and prosecute rapes.
Furthermore, the little information available about rape victims indicates
that many have a bad reputation in part because rapists deliberately seek out
such persons as victims, knowing their charges will not be believed.13 7 Evidence
of a victim's reputation for chastity is by its very nature unreliable. 38 Further,
sexual battery by its violent nature often makes that evidence irrelevant, although Florida courts have repeatedly indicated that it is admissible. 3 9
In general, two types of evidence about the victim's character have been
discussed in Florida rape and sexual battery cases: evidence of the victim's
reputation for chastity in the community and evidence of specific instances of
sexual intercourse between the victim and individuals other than the defendant.1 40 The Sexual Battery Code does not comment on the introduction of
reputation evidence to show chastity or lack thereof, but because this type of
evidence has long been allowed in Florida,1 4' the doctrine still prevails. Florida
should follow the trend of other states1 42 and the proposal of the federal government143 and disallow irrelevant reputation evidence, which serves only to
create prejudice against the victim. 1 " Furthermore, the use of this questionable
135. The "guidance" set forth in F. Lee Bailey and Henry Rothblatt's manual for the

defense attorney involved in sex crime cases exemplifies the potential trauma of cross examination: "Do not launch a premature attack upon the complainant unless you are certain
you can back it up. Indeed your appearance of being sympathetic to the complainant may
induce her into a false sense of security and increase her vulnerability to cross examination."
F. BAILEY & H. RoHmBLATr, CauMEs OF VIOLNCE: RAPE AND OTHER SEx CRIMES §288 (1973).
136. See INST. FOR SOCIAL RESEARCH & DEvELoPMENT, 83 DrvisION OF Gov'T RESEARCH REv.
3 (1975); MICHIGAN'S WOMEN'S TASK FORCE ON RAPE, BACKGROUND MATERIAL FOR A PROPOSAL
FOR CRIMINAL CODE REFORM TO RESPOND TO MICHIGAN'S RAPE CRISIs 3 (1973); Comment, supra
note 9, at 920-21.
137. See M. AMiR, PATTERNS OF FORCIBLE RAPE 25 (1971); Note, Evidence: Evidence of
Prosecutrix' Sexual Relations with Persons Other Than Defendant in Rape Prosecutions, 29
OKLA. L. REv. 742, 747 (1976); Comment, Complainant Credibility in Sexual Offense Cases: A
Survey of Character Testimony and PsychiatricExperts, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRuM. 67, 70 & n.34
(1978).
138. "With our ever-escalating level of urban living, where neighbors are often strangers,
reputation is an elusive, nebulous concept at best." Note, supra note 14, at 501. See also
Comment, supra note 137, at 747.
139. Nickels v. State, 90 Fla. 659, 106 So. 479 (1925); Peterson v. State, 90 Fla. 861, 106
So. 75 (1925); Tully v. State, 69 Fla. 662, 68 So. 934 (1915); Rice v. State, 35 Fla. 236, 17 So.
286 (1895); Huffman v. State, 301 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974).
140. Huffman v. State, 801 So. 2d 815, 816 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974).
141. See cases cited note 139 supra.
142. See, e.g., CAL. EvM. CODE §1103 (West Supp. 1977); COLO. REv. STAT. §18-3-407
(Supp. 1976); MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN. §750.520j (Supp. 1977); Omo REv. CODE ANN.
§2907.02(D) (Page Supp. 1976); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, §750 (Supp. 1977).
143. H. R. 4728, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
144. Although Florida seems to make a distinction between "reputation for chastity or
want oV' and prior specific acts (favoring the former), is there really any difference in the
minds of the jury? Once the victim is shown to be unchaste- by either type of evidence -she
is prejudiced in the eyes of the jury. Assistant State Attorney Jost confirmed this tendency.
She stated that juries very frequently acquit once it is known that the victim is not a virgin.
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evidence is subject to attack because "it introduces a multiplicity of collateral
issues which may confuse the jury. The introduction of reputation testimony
tends to cause the jury to react emotionally rather than rationally, thus distracting its attention from a factual determination of the presence or absence
of actual consent at the moment of rape.' 41 To assure a trial of the material
issues of the crime rather than the persecution of the victim,1'- such evidence
should no longer be permissible in sexual battery prosecutions.
Throughout Florida's history, whether proven by reputation 47 or testimony
of prior conduct, a victim's ]ack of chastity has been presumed to be probative
of consent.1 48 The new Sexual Battery Code endorses this view by codifying the
notion that a victim's prior sexual activity may be introduced to prove consent
if that evidence is deemed relevant. 49 In fact, the new statute is a step backward from case law. Although Florida cases had maintained that prior specific
acts would only be introduced to show "promiscuous intercourse with men, or
common prostitution,"1 9 the new statute allows testimony concerning specific
instances of prior consensual sexual activity when such activity "shows such a
relation to the conduct involved in the case that it tends to establish a pattern
of conduct or behavior on the part of the victim which is relevant to the issue
of consent."'15 This broader language could very well allow admission of more

Furthermore, Ms. Jost indicated that juries often apply an "assumption of the risk" theory i.e., if the victim is shown to be unchaste, the jury determines that she has somehow assumed
the risk of rape and the defendant is then usually acquitted. Interview with Margaret Jost,
supra note 57. See also, H.

KALVEN

& H. ZEISEL, TiE AMERICAN JURY 249-57 (1966). "Where it

perceives an assumption of risk the jury, if given the option of finding the defendant guilty
of a lesser crime, will frequently do so. It is thus saying not that the defendant has done
nothing, but rather that what he has done does not deserve the distinctive opprobrium of
rape. If forced to choose in these cases between total acquittal and finding the defendant
guilty of rape, the jury will usually choose acquittal as the lesser evil." Id. at 254.
145. Note, supra note 14, at 502.
146. "Character evidence, while purporting to protect an accused, is actually a ruse
whereby a jury's attention is diverted from the particulars of a defendant's actions at the
time of an alleged sexual assault to the complainant's past life and conduct." Comment, supra
note 137, at 75.
147. Huffman v. State, 301 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974).
148. Raulerson v. State, 102 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1958); Nickels v. State, 90 Fla. 659, 106 So.
479 (1925); Tully v. State, 69 Fla. 662, 68 So. 934 (1915); Rice v. State, 35 Fla. 236, 17 So.
286 (1895); Huffman v. State, 301 So. 2d 815 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1974); Edmondson v. State, 146
So. 2d 395 (Fla. 3d D.C.A. 1962).
149. FLA.STAT. §794.022(2) (1975).
150. Rice v. State, 35 Fla. 236, 238, 17 So. 286, 287 (1895). See also Nickels v. State, 90
Fla. 659, 687, 106 So. 479, 489 (1825); Huffman v. State, 301 So. 2d 815, 816 (Fla. 2d D.C.A.

1974).
151. FLA. STAT. §794.022(2) (1975). However, neither of the original versions proposed by
the House and the Senate allows for such evidence of prior activity but rather provided in
toto: "Prior consensual sexual activity between the victim and any person other than the
offender shall not be admitted into evidence in prosecutions under section 794.02." (old
numbering). Fla. H. R. 3814, §1(7) (Reg. Sess. 1974, introduced by Rep. Gordon) and Fla.
S.959, §2(6) (Reg. Sess. 1974, introduced by S. Wilson). As with FLA. STAT. §794.022(1) (1975),
the original draft was changed drastically in committee. See note 113 supra.
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evidence than did prior case law and tends to grant too much discretion to the
trial judge.152
Although the above provision further provides that relevancy must first be
established outside the presence of the jury, 153 this merely codifies the discretion the trial court already possessed.154 The procedure does nothing to protect
the victim from the curious onlookers in the audience, 5 but rather invades
the victim's privacy by forcing the revelation of details of her most intimate
private life. The underlying bias of this evidentiary practice was perhaps best
articulated by Justice Braucher, who perceived the prejudices of his male
colleagues: "The 'established law' [use of victim's prior sexual conduct] on
which the court's opinion rests is part of a legal tradition, established by men,
that the complaining woman in a rape case is fair game for character assassination in open court. Its logical underpinnings are shaky in the extreme."'' 5
Change is overdue to shift the focus of the rape inquiry away from the sexual
proclivities of the victim and toward the culpability of the actor.
Additional reasons militate against allowing the prosecuting witness to be
cross-examined about her prior sexual activity. First, such evidence subjects the
witness to unfair surprise because she "cannot reasonably anticipate accusations
and questions regarding specific sexual acts with other men,"' 5 7 especially when
a possibility exists for spurious accusations or suborned testimony. Further-

152. Assistant State Attorney Jost reports that in her experience in sexual battery cases in
Volusia County, the judges invariably admit all evidence of prior specific acts. Furthermore,
even though FLA. STAT. §794.022(2) (1975) provides that such evidence may only be allowed
when consent is at issue, the judges make no such distinction but rather admit the evidence
even when consent is not at issue and also allow it to reflect upon the credibility of the
witness. In Ms. Jost's opinion, "that provision in the statute might as well not exist." Interview with Margaret Jost, supra note 57.
153. FLA. STAT. §794.022(2) (1975).
154. In practice, this is rarely, if ever, done outside the jury's presence. What often happens is that the question regarding prior sexual activity is asked, an objection is made, and
then the judge overrules and the information is admitted into evidence. Interview with
Margaret Jost, supra note 57. Ms. Jost recounted that often she has attempted to get this
evidence ruled inadmissible in an in limine motion before trial. However, the judge's response has usually been that the evidence is not now before him so he cannot rule on the
issue. Consequently, the evidence is elicited on cross-examination and admitted into evidence, all within the presence of the jury. Id.
155, With the adoption of a new pilot program allowing for the television filming of
trials, the victim may be subject to a further invasion of privacy. In In re Post-Newsweek
Stations, 347 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 1977), the Florida supreme court approved of this program for
news media coverage. Although the original order (327 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1976)) set forth guidelines which precluded the requirement of consent to the televising by all parties to the
itigation, jurors, and witnesses, agreement on this guideline was impossible to reach. 337 So.
d 804, 805 (Fla. 1976) and 347 So. 2d at 403. Therefore the supreme court issued an order to
3roceed with the pilot program without such a consent guideline. 347 So. 2d at 403. Because
io special exemption is mentioned for sexual battery victims, it is possible that the victim
ould be subjected to having her testimony electronically recorded and broadcast by television
ameras.
156. Commonwealth v. Manning, 328 N.E.2d 496, 501 (Mass. 1975) (Braucher, J., disrnting).
157. Note, supra note 26, at 479.
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more, as with reputation evidence, 58 evidence of prior specific acts tends to
introduce collateral issues, thus shifting the emphasis from the acts of the defendant to the past activities of the victim, acts having no direct bearing on
the guilt or innocence of the accused. Most important, evidence of prior sexual
activity should generally be inadmissible because it is irrelevant 59 and of very
slight, if any, probative value.160 Indeed, the "relationship between a woman's
chastity and whether or not she has been raped is simply too attenuated to
warrant consideration as relevant evidence."l61 One author argues that neither
logic nor common sense suggests that information as to a woman's prior consensual sexual conduct aids the trier of fact in determining whether she consented to the alleged rape. 16? He concludes that "it is perfectly obvious that
163
such evidence is totally irrelevant on the issue of consent in rape cases."' If
our judicial system is to purge itself of its bias against the rape victim,164 an
effective starting place would be the elimination of evidence of the victim's
prior sexual activity. One commentator succinctly analyzed the problem: "Of
course, if the trial court judges were doing an adequate job of enforcing the
present rule, there might not be such an urgent need for reform, but the reports received from all sides make it clear that judges are often not giving
sufficient weight to the legitimate needs of the state and the victims."165
As an alternative to the current Rules of Evidence in the Sexual Battery
Code,1 66 a new statute should create a presumption that evidence concerning
the victim's prior or subsequent sexual conduct is irrelevant in a sexual battery
trial.1-7 To avoid interference with the defendant's right to a fair trial,168 if
the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, 169 the presumption should be rebuttable in two instances. First,
158. See text accompanying note 145 supra.
159. The Florida Evidence Code defines relevant evidence as "evidence tending to prove
or disprove a material fact." FtA. STAT. §90.401 (Supp. 1976). FED. R. Evm. 401 defines
relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is
of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence."
160. Note, supra note 6, at 1565.
161. Comment, supra note 9, at 939.
162. Washburn, supra note 133, at 295.
163. Id. Another author comments: "Admitting evidence of a woman's past sexual history
as relevant says three things: that once a woman has lost her virginity she will have sex
indiscriminately; that her sexuality is not hers to refuse and that women who are not virgins
(and not married) are an available sexual pool for men; and that an 'unchaste' woman is less
likely to tell the truth and may cause the conviction of an innocent man." Findlay, supra
note 26, at 205. Such biased assumptions should not be tolerated. Note, supra note 26, at
478-86.
164. Note, supra note 26, at 499. See also Note, supra note 74, at 343; notes 57, 152 and
test accompanying note 156 supra.
165. Washburn, supra note 133, at 308.
166.

FLA. STAr. §794.022 (1975).

167. See, e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. §18-3-407 (Supp. 1976).
168. See text accompanying notes 175-192 infra.
169. CAL. Evm. CODE §782(a)(4) (West Supp. 1977); Florida Evidence Code, FLA. SrA-r
§90.403 (Supp. 1976); Micu. Comp. LAws ANN. §750.520j (Supp. 1977); OHio RaV. CoDn ANN
§2907.02(D) (Page Supp. 1976); Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 5, §21.13(a) (Vernon Supp. 1978)
H. R. 4728, 95th Cong., IstSess. (1977); FaD. R. Evm. 403.
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it should be rebuttable by evidence of the victim's prior or subsequent sexual
activity with the offender. Second, it should also be rebuttable by evidence of
specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen,
pregnancy, disease, or any similar evidence of sexual intercourse demonstrating
170
that the charged acts were not committed by the defendant. The defendant
would thus be required to demonstrate that the proffered evidence meets the
specified criteria before being allowed to question the victim about it, thereby
affording the victim some protection against fabricated charges and improper
innuendo which have no basis in fact. If the court finds the offer of proof
sufficient, the judge should then allow an in camera hearing to determine the
admissibility of the evidence. At the hearing the parties may call witnesses,
including the victim. Finally, if the court determines that the offered evidence
"is relevant and that the probative value of such evidence substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, such evidence shall be admissible in the
trial to the extent an order made by the court specifies evidence which may be
offered and areas with respect to which the alleged victim may be examined or
cross-examined."' 71 Thus, the victim is protected from invasion of her personal
life when such evidence is not relevant, and the defendant is guaranteed a fair
trial172 if he can prove that such evidence is indeed relevant. Such protection is
necessary in this society, where two-thirds of all American women have had premarital intercourse by the age of 25.173 If Florida would exclude testimony of
prior sexual activity except after a rigid procedural test in the limited instances mentioned above, the legislature would demonstrate that it intends to
protect the majority as well as the chaste.
The Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation
Although opponents of measures to limit severely the use of evidence pertaining to the victim's prior sexual activity argue that the proihibition denies
74
the defendant his sixth amendment right to a fair trial, these arguments are
175
specious at best. In Pointer v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court held
that the sixth amendment right of the defendant to confront the witnesses
against him 17 6 is "a fundamental right and is made obligatory on the States by
170.

H. R. 4728, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1977). The threshold xequirement to determine

the relevancy of such evidence is the submission of a motion by the defendant at least 15 days
before trial. "[T]he court may allow the motion to be made at a later date, including during
trial, if the court determines that the evidence is newly discovered and could not have been
obtained earlier through the exercise of due diligence." Id. at 3. See MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§750.520j (Supp. 1977); OHIo RFv. CODE ANN. §2907.02(D) (Page Supp. 1976).
171. H. R. 4728, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1977).
172. See text accompanying notes 175-192 infra.
173. Of those married by that age, the figure rises to 81%. M. HuNT,SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN
THE 1970's 33-34 (1974). Furthermore, a study of 688 college women from 21 American colleges
showed that 43.2% reported that they had had premarital intercourse. Luckey & Nass, A Comparison of Sexual Attitudes and Behavior in an InternationalSample, 31 J. OF MArn. & FAM.
364, 375 (1969). With the increased permissiveness of sexual mores since 1969, it is reasonable
to assume that today the percentage would be even higher.
174. See Limitations on Evidence, supra note 133.
175. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
176. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
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the Fourteenth Amendment.""'7 Included in the right of confrontation is the
79
right to cross-examine witnesses." 8 In California v. Green" Mr. Justice White
further explicated the parameters of the confrontation clause:
Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his statements
under oath - thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and
guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2)
forces the witnesses to submit to cross-examination, the "greatest legal
engine ever invented foir the discovery of truth"; (3) permits the jury
that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the
witness in making his statement,80 thus aiding the jury in assessing his
credibility. (footnotes omitted).1

The proposed changes in the Florida Sexual Battery Code do nothing to
abrogate the safeguards contemplated by Califofrnia v. Green. First, the proposal does not alleviate the necessity for the victim to testify in court under
8
oath; second, the victim must still undergo cross-examination on all relevant '
matters; third, the proposal does not interfere with the opportunity of the jury
to observe the demeanor of the witness as she testifies to the charge of sexual
battery against the accused.
In a more recent case, Davis v. Alaska,' 8' the United States Supreme Court
extended the confrontation rights of the accused by holding that "[t]he State's
policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender's record
cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as the effective cross'
examination for bias of an adverse witness."'

83

The pronouncement in Davis,

however, falls short of providing a constitutional argument against restricting
the use of evidence of prior sexual activity. The Davis court concluded that the
defense was entitled to attempt to show that the witness was biased because of
his vulnerable status as a probationer and his concern that he might be a
suspect in the burglary charged against the defendant s4 No parallel exists in
the case of sexual battery; prior sexual activity indicates neither bias nor involvement in crime. Hence, one may conclude "that evidence of prior criminal
conduct is a more valid reason for rejecting the credibility of a witness than is
evidence of prior sexual conduct. In short, one kind of evidence is of much
18
greater relevance to the issue at hand than is the oither.' 5 Since the proposed
change in the Sexual Battery Code would not infringe on the defendant's op177.
178.
179.
180.

380 U.s. at 403.
Id. at 404.
399 U.S. 149 (1970).
Id. at 158.

181.

The proposed bill provides for a special procedure to determine the relevancy of

prior acts with the defendant and with others to show source of semen, pregnancy, etc. See
text accompanying notes 170-171 supra. As discussed previously, prior sexual activity with
those other than the defendant is fundamentally irrelevant. See notes 160-165 supra and ac-

companying text.
182. 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
183. Id. at 320.
184. Id. at 309-18.
185. Comment, Criminal Procedure:Evidence of a Rape Victim's PriorSexual Conduct,
6 PAC. L. J. 261, 264 (1975).
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portunity to present all relevant evidence 8 c to the court, it would be constitutionally sound.
That the right to cross-examination is subject to limitations is further support for the conclusion that evidence of the victim's prior sexual activity may
be restricted without infringing upon the defendant's right to a fair trial. Lest
some read Davis as authority for unlimited cross-examination, Mr. Justice
Stewart added: "[i]n joining the Court's opinion, I would emphasize that the
Court neither holds nor suggests that the Constitution confers a right in every
case to impeach the general credibility of a witness through cross-examination
about his past delinquency adjudications or criminal convictions."' 1 7 If the
former criminal is afforded such protection, then certainly the victim of a
sexual assault is entitled to at least the same considerations, especially because
prior sexual activity is not analogous to prior criminal activity. Furthermore,
in an earlier case, Alford v. United States,'8s reaffirmed in Davis, the Court had
announced a limitation on permissible cross-examination. Noting that a witness
is not protected from being discredited on cross-examination, the Court asserted that "[t]here is a duty to protect him from questions which goi beyond
the bounds of proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy or humiliate
him." 18 9 In light of the standard practice in a sexual battery trial allowing the
victim to be "fair game for character assassination in open co'urt,"' 90 the limitation announced in Alford would apply to cross-examination regarding the victim's previous sexual behavior. An example of the defense strategy recommended by F. Lee Bailey and Henry Rothblatt demonstrates the necessity for
limiting such cross-examination: "The ultimate determinant in deciding
whether to wage an all-out attack on the complainant which will be likely to
reduce her to tears is whether you possess the ammunition with which to break
her. If you can totally destroy her character or reputation, as with proof of
prior specific criminal or immoral acts . . . launch your attack."' 91 If the
judicial system is genuinely interested in avoiding abuses of the sexual battery
victim, evidence of the victim's prior sexual activity should not be admissible
except for the limited situations specified in the recommended amendments to
the Florida Sexual Battery Code.
CONCLUSION
The Florida Legislature's endeavors to reform rape legislation are commendable. The most positive aspects of the new Sexual Battery Code are its
186. See note 182 supra.
187. 415 U.S. at 821 (Stewart, J., concurring).
188. 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
189.

Id. at 694.

190. Commonwealth v. Manning, 328 N.E.2d 496, 501 (Mass. 1975) (Braucher, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 156 supra.
191. F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATr, supra note 135, at 212. The authors comment further:
"If you do not wage an all-out attack on the complainant, it may be possible to entrap her.
In examining her, avoid being overly solicitous. Such conduct is likely to annoy the jurors. If
the complainant engages in emotional outbursts, accept them stoically. Do not argue with her.
Her emotionalism should lead her more easily into traps which you set for her." Id. See also
Strick, Requiem for the Adversary System, 7 JuRIs DOcTOR 18, 24 (1977).
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sex neutrality, inclusion of forcible violations other than sexual intercourse,
and specific provision for various degrees of sexual battery. More clarity is
needed, however, regarding spouses. Are they included as potential offenders?
If not what is the exact definition of a spouse under the circumstances of sexual
battery? The most egregious defect in the new code is the section on the Rules
of Evidence.192 The provision that "the court may instruct the jury with respect
to the weight and quality"'1 9 of the victim's testimony should be deleted. In-

stead, a general instruction that all testimony should be carefully examined
without special emphasis on the victim would be sufficient. Furthermore, reputation evidence as to the victim's chastity should be specifically deemed inadmissible because of its lack of reliability. Evidence of specific acts of prior sexual activity of the victim should be presumed irrelevant except in two instances' 94 and then allowed only after a careful determination of relevance. 19-5
These amendments to the Sexual Battery Statute would shift the focus in sexual battery trials to the proper issues, thus resulting in a less traumatic trial
experience for the victim and a correspondingly greater willingness by the
victim to report the crime. 1 96 The victim would be afforded the same protection accorded victims of other violent crimes, while the defendant would alsoi
97
be assured a fair trial.'
The Florida Legislature should further reform the Sexual Battery Code to
protect the victim as an important initial measure addressing the grave problems associated with sexual battery. However, legislation alone cannot eliminate rape because attitudes which have supported outdated laws and procedures and which have allowed the crime of rape to be so common in our
society remain. Society's attitudes toward sexually battered women, and women
in general, must change. As long as the rape victim is looked upon with
suspicion and distrust, as long as she is considered to have invited the crime,
and as long as juries feel more empathy for the accused than for the victim,
"most rapists are likely to commit the crime with impunity."'' 98 Until bias
against the rape victim is dispelled, no statutory changes will effect adequate
changes in the grim rape and rape conviction statistics. Indeed, only when
there is a general awareness of the quandary in which the rape victim has been
placed by a society which tends to adopt a male perspective will genuine and
fundamental change occur.'" In the final analysis, a legislative mandate establishing a strong public policy in support of the sexual battery victim would ex192. FLA. STAT. §794.022 (1975).
193. FLA. STAT. §794.022(1) (1975). The courts have translated this phrase to mean that
the testimony of the victim should be rigidly scrutinized. See Tibbs v. State, 337 So. 2d 788,
790 (Fla. 1976); Berezovsky v. State, 335 So. 2d 592, 593 (Fla. 3d D.G.A. 1976).
194. See text accompanying note 171 supra.
195. See notes 166-169 supra and accompanying text.
196. See notes 9-11 supra and accompanying text.
197. "After analyzing all the arguments supporting and challenging the enactment of
rape reform legislation, it appears that the overriding fear that the defendant's constitutional
rights will be violated is unfounded. And such an unfounded fear should not be the basis for
denying equal protection to the rape victim." Note, supra note 26, at 502.
198. Note, supra note 74, at 354.
199. Id.
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